This paper provides a survey of the applications of evolutionary algorithms in macroeconomic models. Discussion is organized around the issues related to stability of equilibria, equilibrium selection, transitional dynamics, and the long-run evolutionary dynamics di erent from rational expectations equilibrium outcomes. The survey also discusses criteria that can be used to evaluate the performance and usefulness of evolutionary algorithms in macroeconomic context.
Introduction
The objective of this survey is to address the issues related to the macroeconomic models in which agents' adaptation is modeled using the evolutionary algorithms: genetic algorithms, classi er systems, and genetic programming. The common feature of these algorithms is the process of adaptation that is based on propagation of decision rules that performed well in the past and on occasional experimentation with new decision rules. 1 In macroeconomic environments, agents' heterogenous beliefs and decisions a ect the levels of endogenously determined prices which in turn a ect agents' payo s and performance of di erent decision rules over time. This self-referential character of these economies is the main distinction between these environments and other economic applications of these algorithms.
There are several advantages to modeling adaptation in this way. These algorithms impose low requirement on the computational ability of economic agents. They allow for modeling the heterogeneity of agents' beliefs. Survival of decision rules depends on their performance, measured by the payo that agents receive b y employing them. Also, these algorithms perform better than models with rational agents or alternative models of adaptive behavior in terms of their ability to explain the features observed in experimental economies, as well as some of the features of the actual macroeconomic time series.
The research questions addressed by the studies of these algorithms in macroeconomic models can be classi ed into four categories. First, the issues related to the convergence and stability of equilibria in the models with unique rational expectations equilibria. Second, the use of the algorithms as equilibrium selection devices in the models with multiple equlibiria. Third, the examination of transitional dynamics that accompanies the equilibrium selection process. Fourth, examination of learning dynamics that are intrinsically di erent from the dynamics of the rational expectations versions of the models. The exposition in this survey follows this categorization.
The survey will also focus on the methodology for evaluting the usefulness of these algorithms in modeling adaptive behavior. One of the evaluation criteria is the comparison of the predictions of the evolutionary models with those of the rational expectations models and other learning algorithms. Further, where possible, the evaluation will include the comparison of the features of the time series generated by these algorithms with actual time series. Finally, in case that evidence from the experiments with human subjects exists, the use of experimental data in evaluating evolutionary models will also be discussed.
The second section describes applications of the genetic algorithm to the cobweb model which has a unique rational expectations equilibrium. The third section gives an overview of applications in models with multiple equilibria, 2-period overlapping generations models, n-period overlapping generations model, overlapping generations models with periodic equilibria, a model of growth with increasing returns to scale, and a search model of money. The fourth section gives an overview of the applications that result in the long-run learning dynamics di erent from the rational expectations outcomes in an asset pricing model, cobweb model, an exchange rate model and a model of currency crisis. The fth section discusses issues related to the interpretation of the results and topics for further research. Arifovic (1994) uses the genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975) to model adaptation of rms' production decisions in the cobweb model. The model has a unique rational expectations equilibrium (Muth, 1961) . The learnability and stability of this equilibrium have been investigated using a number of di erent adaptive algorithms as well as simulating it in the experiments with human subjects. Thus, the results of the genetic algorithm (GA) adaptation can be compared to the behavior of other learning algorithms and evaluated against the experimental evidence.
Learnability of Equilibria

Cobweb Model
The GA is a directed stochastic search algorithm based on the mechanics of natural selection. It works with a population of binary strings (chromosomes) that represent possible solutions to the search problem. Each binary string has a tness value that represents a measure of the performance in a given environment. A population of binary strings is updated using reproduction, crossover, and mutation. Reproduction makes copies of binary strings and does it in such a w ay that, over time, binary strings with higher tness values receive larger number of copies. Crossover represents randomized exchange of parts of binary strings, while mutation randomly changes the values of bit positions. 2 An important feature of the GA that contributes to its e ciency is implicit parallelism, a parallel processing of a large numberof schemata. A schema (Holland 1975 ) is a similarity template describing a subset of strings with similarities at certain string positions. They are described over a ternary alphabet, f0 1 g where 0 and 1 are considered as speci c bits and is a don't care symbol. Holland's schema theorem asserts that the number of schemata with above a verage tness increases exponentially over time. In addition, Holland (1975) demonstrated that the operation of reproduction and crossover on successive generations causes the candidate solutions to grow in the population approximately at a mathematically optimal rate. Optimality is de ned by viewing the search strategy as a set of multi-armed bandit problems, for which the optimal strategy is known. In a multiarmed bandit problem, the agent has to choose each period between one of the n alternatives with constant expected payo s which are unknown a priori.
In the cobweb model, there are n rms in a competitive market that are price takers and that produce the same, perishable good. Due to a production lag, the quantity produced depends on the expected price level. The cost of a production of a rm i is given by: C i t = xq i t + 1 2 ny(q i t ) 2 (1)
where C i t is a rm i's cost of production for sale at time t, q i t is a quantity i t produces for sale at time t, a n d x and y are parameters greater than zero. The pro t of an individual rm, i t , i s g i v en by:
i t = P t q i t ; C i t
where P t is the price of the good at time t. The optimal quantity produced by r m i at time t is given by: q i t = 1 yn (P e i t ; x):
where P e i t is rm i's expectation of price P t . The resulting market clearing price is given using the demand equation:
In the unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE), where P e i t = P e t = P t , quantity q i t = q and price P t = P are constant. If rms have naive expectations where the expected price is equal to the last period's price, the model converges to the REE for the cobweb stable case, i.e. when B=y < 1, and diverges away for the cobweb unstable case, i.e. when B=y >1.
In the genetic algorithm application, rms' one-period decision rules are represented by binary strings . A rm i, i = 1 : : : n , m a k es a decision about its production for time t using a binary string of nite length`, written over f0 1g alphabet. A binary string is rst decoded into an integer value and then normalized to give the quantity q i t 2 0 q max ], where q max is the maximum quantity that a rm can produce. The quantity q i t represents rm i's production decision at time period t.
Once the quantities are determined, the market-clearing price P t is computed using (4). This price is in turn used to compute rms' pro ts at time t. A pro t that rm i earns determines the tness, i t of rm i's decision rule.
The population of decision rules is then updated in order to create a population of rules that will be used at time t + 1 .W e will discuss two v ersions of the GA that are implemented in order to update rms' decision rules. The rst one, the basic GA, includes application of reproduction, crossover and mutation. The second one, the enhanced GA, besides these three, includes the election operator.
Reproduction makes copies of individual binary strings. The criterion used in copying is the value of the tness function. Binary strings with higher tness value are assigned higher probability of contributing an o spring that undergoes further genetic operation. There are several di erent w ays to perform this operator.
The one used for the cobweb applications is called proportionate selection where a probability that a binary string i receives a copy C i t is given by: P(C i t ) = i t P n i=1 i t i = 1 : : : n :
The algorithmic form of the proportionate selection is like a biased roulette wheel where each string is allocated a slot sized in proportion to its tness. A number of spins of the wheel is equal to the number of strings in a population. Each spin yields a reproduction candidate. Once a string is selected, its exact copy i s m a d e . When n copies of strings are made (the number of strings in a population is kept constant), the reproduction is completed. These copies constitute a mating pool which then undergoes application of other genetic operators.
Another commonly used reproduction operator is tournament selection. A copy of a string is selected in the following way. T w o strings are selected randomly. T h e tness values of the two selected strings are compared and the copy of the one with the higher tness value is made. Strings that participated in the tournament are placed back i n to the original population and thus each one can be selected for the tournament again. Again, these steps are repeated n times to create a population of n copies.
Crossover exchanges parts of pairs of randomly selected strings. It operates in two stages. In the rst, two strings are selected from the mating pool at random. Then in the second stage, a number k is selected, again, randomly from (1 : : :; 1) and two new strings are formed by s w apping the set of binary values to the right of the position k. The total of n=2 ( n is even integer) pairs are selected and the crossover takes place on each pair with probability p cross . An example of the crossover between two c hromosomes for`= 12 and k = 5 is given below: Mutation is the process of random change of the value of a position within a string. Each position has a small probability, p mut , of being altered by m utation, independent of other positions. The role of this operator is to maintain population diversity.
The election operator tests newly generated o spring before they are permitted to become members of a new population. A potential tness based on last period's price is computed for each o spring. Then, two parents and two corresponding o spring are ranked according to their tness value, from the highest to the lowest, and the top two are taken as members of the new population of decision rules. In case of a tie between a parent and an o spring, an o spring becomes a member of the new population.
The application of the genetic operators on the members of population t results in a population of rules that are used at time period t + 1. The above described steps are applied for T iterations. Initial population at time period 0 is randomly generated.
The whole process may b e g i v en the following economic interpretation. Reproduction works like the imitation of successful rivals. Binary strings of these rms have high tness values and are copied by others. Strings with lower tness values, which means worse production decisions and lower pro ts, get less copies (or none) in the next generation. Crossover and mutation are used to generate new ideas on how m uch to produce and o er for sale, recombining existing beliefs and generating new ones. If election operator is included, the above i n terpretation may b e m o d i e d in the following way. I n e a c h period rms generate new production decisions using genetic operators. They compare the tness of these new potential proposals to the old set, under the market conditions observed in the past. Only new ideas that appear promising on such grounds are actually implemented.
Note that in this application of the genetic algorithm adaptation, individual rms do not use rst-order conditions for decision making, as they do in the other learning algorithms previously studied in the context of the cobweb model. Simulations using di erent cobweb and genetic algorithm parameter values converged for both stable and unstable cobweb case. The enhanced genetic algorithm converged to the REE values, while the basic GA approached the equilibrium and then continued uctuating around it due to the continuing e ects of mutation. 3 Arifovic also implements the multiple-population GA where each rm is endowed with an entire population of strings. We can think of these strings in such a p o p ulation as an agent's mutually competing ideas about the right b e h a vior in a given environment. In each time period, only one string is selected as a string that determines agent's behavior. The probability o f c hoosing a particular string is proportional to its performance under prede ned conditions. Although an agent c hooses only one string from among the whole collection, she evaluates ex post all of the alternative ideas. Thus, in the context of the cobweb model, in each time period t, a r m c hooses one binary string from a whole collection and uses that as its actual production decision. Once the market-clearing price is computed, the rm uses that price to compute pro ts that each string in the collection would have earned at that price level. These pro ts determine the binary strings' tness values. Once tness values are computed, the application of GA operators takes place within each population of strings, i.e. at the level of each individual rm. This is the framewo r k t h a t i s r i c her than the single-population framework in that the rms have a n umber of di erent ideas about possible production quantities.
Even though this is a more complex framework, the computational requirements are identical to those of the single-population case. Application of the election-operator is required for the convergence of the multiple-population GA to the REE. When the convergence occurs, all of the binary strings, in all of the populations, decode to the REE quantity. Without the election operator, simulations are characterized by wide and erratic uctuations that do not die out over time. So, it appears that in a model of individual learning, agents have to be more sophisticated, i.e. use the election operator, in order for the the evolutionary model converge to REE.
In the single-population framework, adaptation and learning take place at the level of the entire population. This type of learning can be referred to as social learning. On the other hand, in the multiple-population framework, learning takes place at the individual level and thus this type of learning can be referred to as individual learning. Note that we could add elements of social learning to the multiple-population framework by allowing individual agents to observe occasionally some of the strategies that other agents are contemplating or using.
T h e G A b e h a vior and the patterns observed in the experiments with human subjects are also contrasted with the patterns generated by three other commonly used learning algorithms: cobweb expectations, sample average of past prices and least squares . This represents an example of how w e can develop the criteria for testing the performance of di erent learning algorithms and address the issue related to the arbitrariness of choice of a particular algorithm. The objective i s t o examine if a model based on a particular set of behavioral assumptions consistently outperforms models based on di erent b e h a vioral assumptions in capturing and explaining the behavior observed in the experiments with human subjects.
Three aspects of the Wellford's (1989) experimental data, namely the absence of divergent patterns in the cobweb unstable case, uctuations around cobweb model equilibrium values and the greater price variance of the unstable case are used for the evaluation of the performance of the above three learning algorithms and the GA. Arifovic shows that the GA exhibits the same behavior, i.e. is able to capture all three features of the experimental data and does better than any of the other three algorithms. For example, the convergence of moving average schemes is smooth without uctuations, least squares and cobweb expectations diverge away for the cobweb unstable case. At the same time, GA (both single-and multiple-population designs) converge for both stable and unstable case, exhibiting uctuations around the equilibrium values along the transition path. Finally, GA price patterns also show that the price variance is greater in simulations of the unstable case than in the simulations of the stable case. The di erence is statistically signi cant. Dawid and Kopel (1998) use a version of the cobweb model with xed costs to illustrate how the outcomes of genetic algorithm simulations can depend on the details of a particular coding scheme. In their version of the cobweb model, the costs are given by: C i t = z + yq 2 i t if q i t > 0 and equal to 0 if q i t = 0 : For a low enough xed cost z, the homogenous REE exists where all rms produce identical quantities. As the size of z increases, there exists a heterogeneous equilibrium with a fraction of rms producing positive quantities, while the remaining rms stay o u t o f the market. Both those that produce and those that do not earn zero pro ts in this equilibrium. Finally, when z reaches a high enough value, there is no equilibrium in which rms (or fraction of them) produce positive quantities. The implementation of the genetic algorithm is the same as the one described in the single-population design, i.e. each rm's production decision is represented by a binary string and reproduction, crossover, and mutation are used for the updating of the decision rules.
A Model with Fixed Costs and Entry/Exit Decisions
For the set of the parameter values for which the unique, homogenous REE exists, the genetic algorithm population converged to the REE quantity. F or the set of the parameter values for which only the heterogeneous equilibrium exists, the genetic algorithm population converges to the positive quantities that are optimal given the observed price. However, xed costs are so high that rms make negative pro ts. Thus, this is not a REE since each individual rm would be better o by exiting the market and making zero pro ts instead. Note that a homogenous state in which all rms set their production decisions to zero is not a REE either. In that case, the market price would be so high that an individual rm would bene t by making a unilateral decision to start producing again. Dawid and Kopel use the above simulation result to demonstrate how the coding scheme can have impact on the results of GA adaptation using the condition for local asymptotic stability f o r the GA dynamics.
A 
for all j 2 , where is a set of all possible states that can be encoded with a string of length`, j 6 = k, e k is state under consideration, e j is the state with a higher tness value, d(j k) is the distance between the two outmost bits where j and k di er in value. If there is one j 6 = k such that the inequality holds the other way round, e k is unstable. 4 This condition shows that a state consisting almost only of strings k will converge to the uniform state e k if the strings j, that are receiving a higher tness in the current state, di er from k in bits positioned far apart. The number of strings j will grow in proportion to their tness. However, as long as the ratio between j (e k ) and k (e k ) is not too large, there is relatively high probability that a string j will be paired with string k and thus destroyed during crossover since any crossover point between the two outmost di ering bits will destroy j. Dawid and Kopel show that the state e k in which all rms produce positive quantities and make negative pro ts is locally stable with respect to the string j that prescribes zero production. This string earns zero pro ts and thus has higher tness value than string k with negative pro ts. The string k that encodes positive quantity (0.7143) is given by: 1011011011 and the string that encodes zero production is a string of all zeros. Strings j and k di er in the rst and last bits, and thus, d(j k) = 9 . D a wid and Kopel show that, since the value of d(j k) divided by`; 1 outweighs the e ects of the di erence in the tness values, inequality (6) holds implying the local asymptotic stability of state e k .
A modi ed coding scheme where an extra bit is added to the binary string that is interpreted as an entry/exit decision (if it is equal to 0, stay out of the market and set q i t = 0 ) c hanges the stability results. The state which decodes to a positive production quantity loses its stability since the decision to switch b e t ween q and 0 requires a change of only a single bit, the entry/exit one.
Separation of the decision to enter or exit the market and a quantity determination leads to the behavior of the algorithm where a fraction of the rms produce positive quantities, while the remaining rms stay out of the market. The fraction corresponds to the one required for the existence of the heterogeneous REE.
Coevolution of Di erent F orecasting Rules
Another interesting extension of the GA cobweb model is a paper b Franke (1998) . The paper studies the coevolution of four di erent t ypes of rules used to determine quantities produced. The rst is the` xed-production' rule (QF-strategy) where a binary string encodes a quantity that will be produced. The second one is the`adaptive expectations' rule (AE-strategy) where a binary string encodes the value of the parameter that controls the speed of adjustment. The third is thè regressions of order 1' rule (R1-strategy). With this rule, a binary string encodes the length of the sample period that is used to compute the least squares estimate of the coe cient . This coe cient is then used to form price expectations. The fourth is the`regressions of order 2' rule (R2-strategy). According to this rule, least squares estimate takes only prices of every second period. A binary string encodes again the length of the sample period. While QF-strategy yields a quantity t o b e produced, other three rules generate forecasts that are then used in the rst order conditions to determine optimal quantities.
A GA population consists of binary strings that represent these four di erent types of rules. It is initialized randomly with equal fractions of all four types of rules. Reproduction is implemented on the entire population. However, crossover is implemented separately on a subpopulation of each t ype of rule. These di erent rules compete against each other during the genetic algorithm evolutionary process. The system's`collective memory' consists of the pools of four types of strategies from which once extinct types of strategies can be re-activated.
Franke uses the set of Arifovic's (1994) parameter values for the cobweb unstable case. What are the stability properties of these di erent rules in case that each is adopted by all rms? The QF strategy results in convergence to a REE (Arifovic, 1994) . The AE-strategy is stable for su ciently low v alue of . Both, R1; and R2;strategy rules are locally unstable, irrespective of the sample size, for the cobweb unstable case.
Franke examines the behavior of the system in an environment with a deterministic demand curve and in a stochastic environment where there is a disturbance to the demand curve that follows AR(1) process. In a deterministic environment, the GA converges to the REE in which all rms produce the same quantities, but use di erent rules to make these decisions. On average, 75% use the AE-strategy while the QF-strategy almost disappears from the population with only 0.01% rms on average that use it.
The stochastic environment i s c haracterized by the coevolution of strategies. During coevolution, di erent rules get wiped out from the population and brought back in from the`collective memory'. All four types of strategies survive i n t h e population. The largest percentage are still the AE-strategy binary strings, but the second highest percentage is represented by QF strategies. At the same time, R1-and R2-strategies take m uch smaller proportion of the adapted populations. During the coevolutionary process, the total quantity p r o d u c e d b y the GA strategies remains close to the equilibrium quantity.
Competition of di erent rules and their coevolution results in stability of the cobweb model that cannot be achieved when either one of the three forecasting rules is adopted by all rms. The coevolution is characterized by continual change in rules' tness values and thus by continual extinction of those rules whose tness falls below the average and their reappearance (when called from the collective memory). Overall, the competition among di erent forecasting rules has a stabilizing e ect on the economic environment.
Equilibrium Selection
In this section, we look at the use of the evolutionary algorithms as equilibrium selection devices in three types of environments with multiplicity of equilibria: overlapping generations economies with at money, g r o wth model, and search model of money.
Overlapping generations economies with at money
Overlapping generations (OG) economies with at money usually possess multiple equilibrium paths and multiple stationary equilibria. These stationary equilibria have di erent stability properties under the rational expectations and under the adaptive dynamics (see, for example, Lucas, 1986 Marcet and . The section begins with description of the Arifovic (1995) implementation of the GA to the OG economy with two-period-lived agents and two t ypes of monetary policy, constant money supply and constant de cit nance through seignorage. The economy consists of overlapping generations of two-period-lived agents. Each generation consists of an equal number, N, of agents. Every agent of generation t lives over two consecutive periods, t and t + 1, and consumes c t (t) in the rst period (youth) and c t+1 (t) (7) where S(t) are aggregate savings of agents of generation t. If the government pursues a policy of constant money supply, H(t) = H for all t, the di erence equation (7) has the unique stationary, P areto optimal, equilibrium with valued at money and constant price level, i.e. p(t) = p for all t, where p = 2 H=(w 1 ; w 2 )N. This equilibrium is unstable under the perfect foresight dynamics, and is attainable only if the initial price is equal to p . There is also a continuum of monetary equilibria indexed by the initial price level p 0 in the interval (p 1). All of the equilibria with an initial price greater than p converge to the stationary equilibrium in which money has no value.
In case of the second policy, the government nances a constant de cit, G, through seignorage, i.e. G = ( H(t) ; H(t ; 1))=p(t). With this policy, the model has two stationary equilibria with valued at money, a l o w in ation stationary equilibrium, 1 , and a high in ation stationary equilibrium, 2 . T h e l o w in ation stationary equilibrium is Pareto superior. The high in ation stationary equilibrium is the stable solution, being the attractor for a continuum of rational expectations equilibrium paths, starting from 0 2 ( 1 w 1 =w 2 ): (If the initial in ation rate (0) is equal to 1 , the system attains a low in ation stationary equilibrium.) The stability conditions also imply that an increase in the de cit results in a decrease in the in ation rate of a stable stationary equilibrium. In the GA OG economy, there are two populations of binary strings at each t. One represents the rules of the young, members of generation t, and the other the rules of the old, members of generation t ; 1. Each population is updated in alternating time periods, after its members went through a two-period life cycle. Genetic algorithm strings encode the values of rst-period consumption.
A memberi, i 2 f 1 : : : N g, of generation t makes a decision about the rst period consumption at time t using a binary string. S a vings of agent i of generation t s i t , are given as s i t = w 1 ; c 1 i t .
The sequence of events that takes place at time t is the following. First period consumption values are obtained from decoded and normalized binary strings and individual savings are computed. Next, the value of aggregate savings is obtained.
Aggregate savings, together with money holdings of agents that were born at t ; 1, determine the price level of the good that prevails at t. The price of the consumption good at time t is given by:
in the economy with constant money supply, and by:
for P N i s i (t ; 1) > G , in the economy with constant de cit. Then the second period consumption of member i, i 2 f 1 : : : N g, of generation t ; 1 is determined: c i t (t ; 1) = s i (t ; 1)p(t ; 1)
Finally, t n e s s v alues of the members of generation t ; 1 are computed. The tness of a string i of generation t ; 1 i s g i v en by t h e v alue of agent's i utility a t t + 1 (the second period of life): i t;1 = U i (c i t;1 (t ; 1) c i t;1 (t)) = c i t;1 (t ; 1)c i t;1 (t):
The population for generation t + 1 is generated from the population of generation t ; 1, using genetic operators reproduction, crossover, mutation and election.
Once the population of new generation t + 1 is created, the whole cycle is repeated. Population of rules of generation t + 1 represents the young agents, while the members of population t become the old agents. The populations of generations 0 and 1 are randomly generated. The system starts o with Nhunits of money distributed to initially old. Simulations of the environment with constant money supply converged to the stationary equilibrium in which at money is valued. This equilibrium is also the point o f c o n vergence of the adaptive algorithm which uses the sample average of past price levels for the price forecasting (Lucas (1986) ). Likewise, the experimental OG economies simulated by Lim, Prescott and Sunder (1994) exhibited price paths close to the stationary monetary equilibrium.
In the economy with the positive v alue of de cit, the GA converged to the low in ation stationary equilibrium. The least squares learning algorithm studied by Marcet and Sargent (1989) also converges to the low stationary in ation equilibrium. Results of simulations show that the GA also converges for de cit values and initial conditions for which least squares exhibited divergent behavior. 5 In ationary paths observed in experiments with human subjects Sunder 1993 Arifovic, 1995) converged to the neighborhood of the low in ation stationary equilibrium. Moreover, the experimental economies did not exhibit divergent in ationary paths in cases of de cit values and initial conditions for which least squares did not converge. Thus, the GA performs better in capturing the features of the experimental data.
Modeling the evolution of expectations of the in ation rate A di erent approach to modeling agents' decision rules in the GA OG environment is given in Bullard and Du y (1998a) . In their model, a binary string is used to encode expectations of the in ation factor in an environment with constant de cit nanced via seignorage. At t i m e t, an agent i of generation t is endowed with a string that encodes b i (t) that will be used as agent i's expectation of the in ation factor. Then agent i's expectation of the nominal price level p(t + 1) is given by:
These forecasts are then used in the rst order conditions of agent's maximization problem to solve for the optimal value of savings given the expectations b i (t). The model resulted in the convergence to the low in ation stationary equilibrium with l . Larger values of G required more iterations for convergence, Thus, this method of applying genetic algorithm to the overlapping generations model results in the selection of the same equilibrium.
Notice that in this environment, unlike the Arifovic (1995) model, the assumption of utility maximization is maintained. Bullard and Du y argue that in`learning how to optimize' GA implementation where consumption decisions evolve, one assumes (implicitly or explicitly) that all agents have the same view of the future, and that, given the set of commonly held expectations, the GA is used to assign a value of choice variable to the agents. On the other hand, with their method, agents arè learning how to forecast'. They have heterogeneous forecasts and are not sure about the beliefs held by other agents. Because of the lack of information and multiplicity of equilibria, there is a problem of coordinating on a particular equilibrium path.
However, recent evidence from OG experiments where human subjects were asked to make b o t h s a vings decision and forecast of the next period's in ation rate shows that actual saving decisions di er signi cantly from the optimal savings decisions which w ould be implied by individual forecasts (Bernasconi and Kirchkamp, 1999) .
The question of what seems to be a better way o f s i m ulating decision making process in models with boundedly rational agents, as well as in the experiments with human subjects, remains open.
An n-period model
Another application of GAs to the OG environment is the Bullard and Du y (1998b) model in which agents live f o r n 2 periods. It is again a pure endowment economy with at money being the only asset that agents can use to save b e t ween periods. Each generation of agents receives the same endowment pattern such t h a t w 1 > w 2 >: : :>w n > 0. This implies that agents of all generations will be able to achieve their optimal consumption and savings decisions by holding at currency. The government nances a constant de cit via seignorage. This general n-period model also has low stationary perfect foresight equilibria in which at currency has positive v alue, low in ation stationary equilibrium, and high in ation stationary equilibrium.
T h e G A i s i m p l e m e n ted in the following way. A t each time period t, there are n populations of binary strings that represent decision rules of n generations of agents alive a t t. Each generation consists of an equal number, N, of agents. The total population of agents at time t is thus equal to n N. A binary string is used for the construction of an autoregressive forecasting rule. It is interpreted in the following way. One bit determines whether lagged values of prices or rst di erences of prices are used in autoregression. The remaining bits specify which lagged values are used. Using a speci ed autoregression, the forecast of the next period's in ation factor is computed. The forecast is then used to compute the optimal savings decision. Unlike the 2-period set up, agents repeatedly use their forecasting rules to make savings decisions in n ; 1 periods of their lives.
In this n-period set up, a binary string's tness is not set equal to agent's utility as in the models that have been described so far. Instead, the tness is determined by the rule's out-of-sample mean squared error (MSE). The rst half of the available data from past GA iterations is used to estimate the autoregression coe cient. The second half is used to calculate the MSE of a forecasting rule. The tness value of a rule is simply the inverse of the MSE. The tness value is recalculated in every period in which the binary string is used.
Binary strings of members of all generations that make s a vings decisions are updated at each t. A set of rules of agents born at time t is generated using reproduction (tournament selection), crossover, mutation, and election. During the reproduction step, Bullard and Du y implement mixing. With mixing, the entire population of n N rules is used to select copies of binary strings. This way the updating uses the entire stock of genetic information available at t.
Once the rules of agents born at t are determined, members of middle generations experiment with new ideas prior to making savings decisions at t. This process is called emulation. At each t i m e t, a m e m ber of each middle generation meets another member from the entire n N population. Two rules undergo crossover and mutation in order to create two alternative rules. At this point, a version of the election operator is implemented. The tness values of newly generated rules are calculated, and 4 rules (two old ones and two new ones) are ranked according to their tness values. The agent adopts a rule with the highest tness value.
Once the forecasting rules for all agents who make s a vings decisions at t are determined, optimal savings are computed for each individual agent. Finally, aggregate savings and prices are computed. If the aggregate savings fell short of the amount required to nance the government de cit, a situation interpreted as a currency collapse, t h e g o vernment imposed a taxation scheme to satisfy the de cit nancing constraint. (The tax that every individual has to pay i s s u c h that the de cit nancing constraint is more than satis ed.) Two kinds of outcomes were observed in the GA economies that were simulated for n = 3 a n d n = 7, and for three di erent v alues of G. The rst outcome was convergence to the low-in ation stationary equilibrium. When the convergence occurred, forecasting rules could correctly predict the gross in ation factor even though population consisted of heterogeneous rules. Thus in this economy the convergence to a stationary equilibrium need not imply identical forecasting rules across the individuals.
The second outcome was a convergence to autarchy -state of persistent currency collapse. This outcome was observed more frequently for larger values of n. One way t o i n terpret this result is that the frequency of the persistent currency collapse increases with the increases in the number of times that agents are allowed to change their forecasts. For a given n, currency collapse was more frequent for larger values of G. As the value of G gets closer to G max (maximum value of de cit that can be nanced given agents' lifetime endowment pro les) a larger number of the economies experience the currency collapse.
Cycles and Equilibrium Selection
The issue of equilibrium selection also arises in the OG economies that are, in addition to steady states, characterized by periodic equilibria. Arifovic (1998) and Bullard and Du y (1998) look at the stability of periodic equilibria under the GA dynamics.
3.3.1 2-period cycle We begin with a description of the GA dynamics (Arifovic, 1998) in the OG economy where, in addition to two steady-states autarky, and monetary steady state, 2-period cycle exists. Agents receive one unit of labor endowment w h e n young. They work when young and consume when old. The production function is linear, and one unit of labor, n t , yields one unit of output, y t . Fiat money is the only means for saving. The stock of nominal money is constant o ver time, i.e. H(t) = H for all t. A g e n ts' preferences are given by: max ac t (t + 1 ) ; 1 2 bc t (t + 1 ) 2 ; n(t)
where a > 0, b > 0, n(t) is labor supply when young. Market clearing requires y(t) = n(t) and n(t) = H=p(t). From the condition p(t)n(t) = H, it follows that a gross rate of return on money holdings, R(t) = p(t)=p(t + 1) is equal to n(t + 1 ) =n(t). Using rst-order condition and market clearing conditions, the equilibrium law of motion for the labor supply is given by: n t = a(n t+1 =n t ) ; 1 b(n t+1 =n t ) 2 : (13) For the values of the parameters chosen for the GA application, the model has a unique monetary steady state equilibrium, and a 2-period cycle. In the monetary steady state, n t = n , a n d p t = p t+1 = p for all t. The rate of return on money R(t) is also constant, i.e. R(t ; 1) = R(t) = R . In the 2-period cycle, the endogenous variables cycle between two s e t s o f v alues. The rst one n 1 , p 1 , and R 1 is associated with high labor supply, l o w nominal price level, and high rate of return on money. The other, n 2 , p 2 , and R 2 is associated with low labor supply, high nominal price level, and low rate of return on money.
The application of the GA is identical to the one described for the pure endowment OG economy, except that now instead of rst period consumption, a binary string encodes a labor supply decision. The equations that determine the values of savings and prices, correspond to those given in 3.1 for the pure endowment economy. Fitness values of binary strings are given as values of agents' utilities.
GA simulations always converged to the 2-period cycle, even when initialized in the neighborhood of the monetary steady state. The analysis of the evolutionary dynamics show, rst, that if the GA converges, it converges to the stationary equilibrium values, and, second, that the GA dynamics select the 2-period cycle over the monetary steady state. The 2-period cycle is globally stable under the evolutionary dynamics. 6 The dynamics are de ned by the impact of wealth and intertemporal substitution e ects on the evolution of decision rules. Suppose that the two GA populations are initialized in the neighborhood of the monetary steady state so that the average labor supply of the rst population, n p1 (t), is smaller than n , while the average labor supply of the second population, n p2 (t), is greater than n . This means that the rst population will enjoy the rate of return on money holdings R p1 (t) > R . The second population will experience R p2 (t) < R . What is the impact of these rates of return on further updating of the decision rules? Because the wealth e ect dominates the substitution e ect in the neighborhood of the steady state, the relatively high R p1 (t) w i l l h a ve negative e ect on n p1 (t), and the relatively low R p2 (t) will have negative e ect on further evolution of n p2 (t). Thus, n p1 (t) decreases, and n p2 (t) increases reinforcing the initial e ects, i.e. further increase in R p1 (t), and further decrease in R p2 (t). As this process continues, the labor supplies values of the two populations will be driven away from the steady state and towards the 2-period cycle.
If n p1 (t) and n p2 (t) o vershoot the values of the 2-period cycle, they will get into the region where the substitution e ect dominates. The substitution e ect will, however, halt further divergence of n p1 (t) and n p2 (t) and will bring them back towards the 2-period cycle. This is because further increases in R p1 (t) will now h a ve positive e ect on n p1 (t), and further decreases of R p2 (t) w i l l n o w h a ve negative e ect on n p2 (t).
The above analysis of evolutionary stability illustrates how the interaction between the GA dynamics that are based on the survival of good performing rules and the underlying economic environment can be exploited in order to determine global stability properties of equilibria in the environments characterized by both steady states and periodic equilibria.
3.3.2 Higher-order cycles Bullard and Du y (1998c) examine GA learning in the Grandmont (1985) environment where, in addition to two steady states, and depending on the coe cients of relative risk aversion of the young and old agents, there are also periodic and chaotic equilibrium trajectories. It is again a two-period overlapping generations pure endowment economy with preferences given by: U = c t (t) 1; 1 1 ; 1 + c t (t + 1 ) 1; 2 1 ; 2 where 1 , 2 2 (0 1) denote the coe cient of relative risk aversion of the young and old agents, respectively. The economy has two steady states: the Pareto inferior autarchic steady state, and the Pareto optimal monetary steady state. In addition, for the values of 2 high enough and those of 1 low enough , there are also periodic and chaotic stationary perfect foresight equilibria. However, in these cases, the forward perfect foresight dynamics are not well-de ned, but Grandmont (1985) showed that periodic equilibria of any order and chaos could exist as long-run outcomes in the backward perfect foresight dynamics.
In the GA framework, each binary string decodes into an integer number, k i 2 f1 kg, i 2 f 1 N g. The integer k i prescribes the use of the price level that was realized k + 1 periods in the past as the forecast of next period's price level. For example, consider a young agent i who has chosen k i . Then agent i's forecast of the price level at time t + 1 , F i t P(t + 1)], is equal to P(t ; k i ; 1). Based on this, the agent makes a forecast of the gross in ation factor, and uses it to calculate the optimal savings decisions. This speci cation allows agents to adopt behavior consistent with steady state or periodic trajectories for prices up to the limit k + 1 . The length of a string was set to 8 bits implying the agents could take actions consistent with a periodic equilibrium of an order as high as 256.
The results of simulations showed that GA agents can achieve coordination in this complicated environment, but they always coordinated on simple equilibria, steady state or low-order cycle. For low v alues of 2 (for which complicated stationary equilibrium trajectories do not exist), the GA agents always coordinated on the monetary steady state. For higher values of 2 which imply multiplicity o f stationary equilibria, the GA agents failed to coordinate on the periodic equilibria that are selected by the limiting backward perfect foresight dynamics. The results of simulations showed that the GA agents could learn to coordinate on a monetary steady state and on periodic equilibria of order 2 and 3. The amount of time required for coordination increased with the value of 2 and sometimes displayed qualitatively complicated dynamics for long periods of time prior to convergence to one of the low-order stationary equilibria.
This study demonstrated that the introduction of GA learning (1) does not imply a selection of a unique stationary equilibrium and (2) that simple equilibria are more likely to be achieved. The rst result is consistent with the results of studies of statistical learning algorithms. 7 These studies, which analyzed one-step forward looking systems, showed that any stationary equilibrium can be locally stable. The results depend on the speci ed learning rule. For k-period cycle, agents have to use k order adaptive learning rules. Thus, the second GA result is new in that it reduces the set of`learnable' equilibria and suggests that low-order equilibria are more likely to be reached. Unlike the previous studies, GA environment a l l o ws for competition of forecasting rules of di erent order. In this competition, low-order rules dominate the simulations and lead to convergence to low-order periodic equilibria. It is worth pointing out that the result that simpler equilibria are more likely outcomes of learning is supported by the evidence from the experiments with human subjects.8
Since the behavior of the GA is governed by the performance of forecasting rules as measured by agents' utility, a n i n teresting question is what it is in the dynamics of the GA economy that drives these populations to low-order equilibria. This would involve the investigation of how forecasting rules that prescribe higher-order forecasts perform compared to the low-order rules. The dynamics of GAs is the result of interaction of the economic environment and the performance of di erent kinds of rules. This might p r o vide some intuition for the results of simulations and better understanding of why simple equilibria seem to be more robust in the evolutionary sense than more complicated, high-order equilibria.
Growth and Development
Arifovic, Bullard and Du y (1998) study the adaptation of GA agents in a model of growth where human capital accumulation is subject to increasing returns. The underlying economic model is a version of Azariadis and Drazen (1990) environment in which there are two steady states, low-income steady state,(a poverty trap), and high-income steady state. Under the perfect foresight dynamics, economies that start in the neighborhood of the low-income steady state always remain in the poverty trap. Arifovic et al. describe the mechanism through which the take o can take place.
The model is an overlapping generations economy with a constant n umber of agents, N, b o r n a t e a c h period t. Agents live for two periods and are endowed with one unit of time at every date t. All agents in this economy h a ve the same preferences, U = l n c i t (t) + l n c i t (t + 1). There is a single, perishable good that is both consumed and used as an input into production. Output per unit of e ective labor is produced according to a neoclassical production function, f (k(t)) = k(t) where 2 (0 1) and k(t) is the ratio of capital to e ective labor. The rental rate on physical capital and the wage are given by, r(t) = k(t) ;1 and w(t) = ( 1 ; )k(t) , respectively.
A y oung agent i of generation t makes a decision whether to spend a fraction of time, i t 2 0 1), in training. Each y oung agent inherits the level of e ciency units, x(t), available in the economy a t t i m e t. The level x(t) is the average of the e ciency units (accumulated human capital) of agents of generation t ; 1:
where x j t;1 (t) is the number of e ective units of agent j of generation t;1 at time t. Y oung agents can combine this endowment x(t) with a training decision i t (t) in order to receive x i t (t + 1) e ective units of labor when old through a common training technology denoted by h ( i t (t) x (t)). The key feature of the model is that the individual agent's return to training depends positively on x(t). Thus, x i t (t+1) is given by:
and the private yield on human capital ( ) i s g i v en by the sigmoid function :
(x(t)) = 1 + e ;x(t) ; 2
which is strictly increasing in x(t) and implies the bounds given by (0) = 0 and lim x(t)!1 (x(t)) = 2 ^ :
Parameter > 0 controls the returns to investing in human capital. The accumulation equation for x(t) is then given by
where = 1 N P N i=1 i t (t). In addition, the agent also makes a decision about the fraction, i t of time t wealth, given by total wage earnings, that is saved. Thus, the savings are equal to: s i t (t) = i t (t)w(t) ( 1 ; i t (t)) x(t): (18) These decisions govern the accumulation of physical capital in this economy o ver time.
The model has two steady states, the low-income, poverty trap and the high growth, high-income steady state. The rst one is equivalent to the steady state of a neoclassical model with no growth in human capital and no technological progress. In this steady state, = 0 f o r a l l i and all t and human capital remains at its initial level, i.e. x(t) m ust be constant for all t. The other is the steady state in which > 0 for all i and all t. Thus x(t) i s g r o wing at the constant rate so that for t large enough (t) !^ . The low income steady state is locally stable in the perfect foresight dynamics, while the high income steady state is saddlepath stable.
In the GA model, agent i's, i 2 f 1 : : : N g, decision about the fraction of time that is spent training, i t 2 0 1], and decision about the fraction of wealth that is saved, i t 2 0 1], are represented by a binary string of length l, where l=2 bits are used for coding of each of the two decisions. The rules' tness values are again equal to the values of the utilities earned at the end of the second period of life. The rules are updated using reproduction, crossover, and mutation. At e a c h t, there are two populations of rules, one representing the young and the other representing the old agents.
Regardless of the initial conditions, evolutionary economies eventually take o and reach the high growth steady state which is the globally stable equilibrium under these dynamics. Once the high growth steady state is reached (which happens with probability one), the economy s t a ys there forever. The initial level of x(t) is the variable crucial for the timing of the takeo . The lower the level, the longer the time that the economy s p e n d s i n t h e p o verty trap. Initially, the GA quickly reaches the low-income steady state. At that point, most of the decision rules prescribe no time investment in training since investment i n h uman capital yields lower return and results in lower tness values. However, due to the e ects of mutation, there is always a small fraction of rules with positive v alues of i t . Those rules disappear from the population due to selection pressure. Nevertheless, they contribute to the increase in x(t). Over time, as x(t) increases, it reaches the threshold level beyond which the return on human capital becomes high and tness values of rules that invest in training increase. Once this happens, selection pressure changes because decision rules that call for investing positive amounts of time in training now yield higher tness values than those decision rules that continue to instruct their owners to invest zero time in training. At this point, the GA quickly takes the economy towards the high-income steady state in which individual i t s take positive v alues. The transition phase is relatively short, and once the economy is in the high income steady state, it stays there forever.
Since the exact date of the takeo depends on the speci c sequence of mutations that are responsible for the accumulation of human capital, economies that start with identical initial conditions can have di erent timing of the development takeo . In general, higher rates of experimentation with nonzero investment in training (i.e. higher rates of mutation) imply shorter average time required for the takeo .
The existing models of growth with multiple steady states do allow for sustained di erences in growth rates across economies, but cannot explain how countries that are initially in poverty traps make the transition to a high-development steady state. At the same time, the evolutionary model is able to explain not just long periods of time spent in the neighborhood of poverty traps, but also eventual transition towards the high-growth steady states. It captures two important facts about de-velopment that most of the perfect foresight models fail to take account of. The rst is the result that for initially low l e v els of human capital per-capita, levels that would characterize preindustrial economies, population of boundedly rational agents spends many generations in the neighborhood of the low-income steady state before eventually taking o towards the high-income steady state. This accounts for the fact from Maddison (1982) that today's richest countries were once stagnant for hundreds of years. The second is the result that initially identical economies might experience take-o at very di erent times. This is important since di erent take-o dates imply very di erent l e v els of per capita income across economies once they all reach high-income steady state. This accounts for another development fact, that there is a large and persistent disparity in the levels of per capita income across nations (Parente and Prescott, 1993). 3.5 Search Model of Money Marimon, McGrattan and Sargent (1989) study evolutionary adaptation in a search model of money (Kiyotaki-Wright, 1989) . Depending on the parameter values, this model can have di erent unique stationary equilibria, as we l l a s m ultiple stationary equilibria. Using a version of Holland's (1975) classi er systems, Marimon et al. examine two issues: the learnability of di erent unique equilibria, and the selection of equilibrium in an environment with multiple equilibria.
A classi er system is a collection of if-then rules called classi ers that have condition and action parts. 9 The condition part is usually de ned over the trinary alphabet, f0 1 #g, where the wild card # is interpreted as`don't care' symbol.
The wildcard character is an important part of the condition since it allows agents to decide which pieces of information are relevant and to ignore the others in an environment that is constantly changing. An action part can be a binary string or a string of real numbers. Each classi er has a strength which is the measure of its performance in a given environment.
In every t, a classi er that posts its message thus determining the system's action, is selected using Holland's bucket brigade algorithm. First, a list of classi ers whose condition part matches the current state is determined. These classi ers submit the bids that are proportional to their strengths and the classi er with the highest bid is chosen to post its message. This way the rules that are highly t are given preference over other rules. The bid is subtracted from the classi er's strength and paid to other classi ers responsible for generating the state that the classi er was matched to.
The GA is then used within the classi er system to generate new rules that are tried out. Unlike bucket brigade, which is implemented in every period t, the GA is applied after a given number of periods, T ga . The call to the GA can be made randomly, with T ga specifying the average value. It can also be done asynchronously across di erent classi er systems.
Only a fraction of the entire population of classi ers is replaced when the call to the GA is made. The classi ers that are replaced are chosen on the basis of poor performance. The invocation of GA learning may also be conditioned on particular events such a s l a c k of match or poor performance. Finally, m utation is modi ed because classi er systems use the trinary alphabet. The mutated character changes to one of the other two with equal probability: 0 ! f 1 #g, 1 ! f 0 #g, # ! f 0 1g.
In the Kiyotaki-Wright economy, there are 3 types of agents and 3 types of goods, i = 1 2 3. Type i receives utility from consuming good i, and can produce good i = i + 1 modulo 3. All goods are indivisible, and each can be stored at a cost s k , s 3 > s 2 > s 1 > 0. All agents are assumed to receive the same utility f r o m consumption u(i) > s 3 and u(k) = 0 k6 = i, and to have a commmon discount factor 2 (0 1). The economy lives forever and there is a large and equal number of agents of each t ype. The economy and each agent within it live forever.
In each time period, all agents are randomly matched without regard to their type. An agent has to make 2 decisions sequentially. The rst is, given the good she is holding and the good that the partner is holding, whether or not to trade. The trade occurs only if both partners propose to trade. The second is whether to consume a good she is holding or carry it to the following period. If the good is consumed, agent automatically produces another good i . She is also charged the storage cost of either the good just produced or, if the decision was not to consume, of the good carried to the following period.
In the`fundamental equilibrium', type 1 stores only good 2 to exchange it with type 2. Type 3 stores only good 1 in order to exchange it with type 2. And type 2 stores good 1 half of the time which they exchange for good 3, and stores good 3 half of the time, which they exchange for good 1. Good 1, with the lowest storage cost, serves the role of the medium of exchange.
In the`speculative equilibrium', in addition to good 1 being accepted by t ype 2 agents, good 3, which has the highest storage cost, becomes acceptable by t ype 1 agents. This speculative strategy is optimal whenever the di erence in costs from storing good 3 rather than good 2 is less than the discounted expected utility bene t of storing good 3 rather than good 2. Type 1 players are better o speculating in good 3 (rather than good 2) if storing good 3 makes it more likely that they will be able to successfully trade for their desired consumption good, good 1, and the additional likelihood of this event more than outweighs the additional cost of storing good 3 rather than good 2. This equilibrium is an example of the economy where an endogenously determined medium of exchange, good 3, which has the highest storage costs, is dominated in the rate of return.
Depending on the parameter values, there are economies with a unique fundamental equilibrium, with a unique speculative equilibrium, as well as the economies where both of these stationary equilibria exist. The question are whether these unique stationary equilibria can be learned by boundedly rational agents and what equilibrium is selected in the economies with multiple stationary equilibria.
In Marimon et al. model, each agent uses 2 interconnected classi er systems. The rst one, the exchange classi er system, determines the trading decision, and the second one, the consumption classi er system, determines the consumption decision.
Agents care about long-run average level of utility.
The exchange classi er system consists of a list of strings of length 7. The rst 6 bits are de ned over the trinary alphabet and are used as a condition part, encoding the agent's own good stored and partner's good stored. Each of these takes 3 bits. For the trading decision, the code is in the binary alphabet (1 0), where 1 means trade, while 0 means don't trade. The consumption classi er consists of 4 positions. The rst 3 positions are written over the trinary alphabet and encode the post-trade holdings of agent i. The fourth position can take a v alue of 1 or 0 and represents the action part that decides on whether or not the current holdings should be consumed. Here is an example of two exchange classi ers and their interpretation: own storage partner storage trading decision 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 # # 0 0. First classi er instructs an agent carrying good 1 and who is matched with someone carrying good 3 to trade. Second classi er instructs an agent carrying good 3 and w h o i s m a t c hed with someone not carrying good 3 not to trade.
The rst 3 positions are written over the trinary alphabet and encode the posttrade holdings of agent i. The fourth position can take a v alue of 1 or 0 and represents the action part that decides on whether or not the current holdings should be consumed. Here is also an example of a consumption classi er that instructs the agent who is not holding good 1 (in a post-trade subperiod) not to consume: holdings consumption 0. # # 0 Once two agents are paired and the current holdings of goods are determined, exchange classi ers are matched to the current state. The exchange classi ers whose condition parts are matched to the current state form a class of potential bidders that participate in an auction. The purpose is to select a classi er that makes the decision of agent i at time t. Among the matched classi ers, the rule with the highest strength is given the right to decide. 10 The post-trade state of the world is then used to form a list of consumption classi ers whose condition parts match this state and the consumption classi er from the list with the highest strength makes a consumption decision. 1 0
Only the winning classi ers pay their bids by h a ving them deducted from their strengths. The bid of the winning exchange classi er at t is paid to the winning consumption classi er at t ; 1, which is the classi er that is to be credited with setting the pre-trading state at time t. The bid of the winning consumption classi er at t is paid to the winning exchange classi er at time t, which is to be credited with setting the post-exchange state at t, thereby giving the winning consumption classi er a chance to bid. (If a classi er does not generate any immediate or future payo s, it will drop out of competition due to the penalty of loosing some of its strength when chosen.) In the Marimon et al. implementation, the updating of classi ers' strengths is formulated as a stochastic approximation algorithm where strengths represent cumulative a verages of past payo s.
In general, each agent in a model could have a n e x c hange/consumption classi er system. However, in Marimon et. al set up, all agents of the same type use the same classi er system to make their decisions.
Marimon et al. use several di erent operators to generate new rules. Creation is used in case there is no classi er that matches the condition part of the state. A new classi er is created with its condition part de ned by the current state, and the action part randomly generated. Diversi cation is implemented in case that all the classi ers whose condition part matches the message result in the same action, 1 or 0. A new classi er whose condition part encodes the current state and the action part opposite to that of the existing classi ers is added to the system. Specialization is applied randomly with probability that is diminishing over time. The winning classi er is checked to see whether there are any #'s in the condition part. A new classi er is obtained by exposing each # to a probability of switching to either 0 or 1 depending on which one of the two encodes the current state that was matched to the classi er's condition.
A v ersion of crossover called generalization is performed in 2 steps. First, two integers are drawn randomly, from 1 7]. Then with probability 0.5 the crossover is performed either in, meaning between the two n umbers,or out to the left and to the right of the two selected integers. Within the chosen area, the speci c value of any position (0 or 1) where the two classi ers disagree, is changed to # for both strings. The children are each assigned strengths that are the average of their parents' strengths. For each c hild, a randomly selected individual from the population of potential exterminants' is deleted.
For each set of the economic parameter values, Marimon et al. conducted simulations with: (1) the complete set of rules where the GA was not implemented, and (2) simulations with random initialization of classi ers and use of the genetic algorithm. For the economy where only the fundamental stationary equilibrium exists, the classi er system converged to that equilibrium. However, for the economy where the unique speculative equilibrium exists, the classi er system failed to converge to the equilibrium. Instead, it evolved towards the distribution of holdings that resembled the fundamental equilibrium. In the economy where both the fundamental and the speculative equilibrium exist, the classi er system settled initially to the holdings quite similar to the speculative equilibrium holdings. However, it moved away from that equilibrium and settled in the fundamental equilibrium.
A n umber of other studies (Basci, 1999 Staudinger, 1998 as well as the evidence from the experiments with human subjects (e.g. Du y and Ochs, 1999) have s h o wn that agents can coordinate on fundamental equilibria, but that they have di culty coordinating on the speculative equilibrium. Basci simulates a system with a complete set of classi ers and introduces two modi cations in order to induce players of type 1 to adopt the speculative strategy. First, he reduces the di erential in storage cost between goods 3 and 2, and second, he allows a certain fraction of agents to choose strategies according to their social, i.e. population-wide values, which is referred to as imitation. Neither one of these, when implemented alone, helps the system evolve t o wards the speculative equilibrium, but the combination of the two does result in a high frequency of convergence to the speculative equilibrium. Staudinger, who uses a GA implementation, also varied the size of the storage cost di erential and found that for small enough di erential, the GA always converged to the speculative equilibrium. Overall, speculative equilibria seem to be di cult to learn both by boundedly rational agents as well as by h uman subjects. This is another example where in addition to the equilibrium selection result, we can say that there are equilibria that are`hard' to learn. In this case, this is also supported by the evidence from the experiments with human subjects.
The fact that it is very di cult for both the boundedly rational agents and human subjects to adopt speculative trading strategies raises the question about the plausibility of the speculative equilibrium in the Kiyotaki-Wright e n vironment and the question whether this represents a good way to model the rate of return dominance of money.
Evolutionary Dynamics in the Absence of Equilibrium Behavior
In this section, we l o o k a t s e v eral evolutionary models of bounded rationality that result in the long-run dynamics di erent from the rational expectations dynamics. We b o r r o w a term from Bullard (1994) and call these dynamics learning equilibria. The common feature of the models considered in this section is that there is persistence in uctuations of the prices and excess volatility of the models' variables. These evolutionary economies do not converge to REE and exhibit the features of long-run behavior di erent from the REE dynamics. Lettau (1997) uses GAs to model behavior of mutual fund investors in a simple portfolio choice model. There is a single risky asset whose value, v, is normally distributed. Price of this asset, p 0 , is constant and given exogenously to mutual fund investors. The agent's utility i s g i v en by U(W) = ;exp(; W) where is coe cient of absolute risk aversion and W is net payo equal to (v ; p 0 ). Under the rational expectations, the optimal solution for a demand for the risky asset, s, is: s = 1 v ; 2 p 0 with optimal coe cients 1 and 2 , 1 = 2 = 1 = 2 v : Mutual fund investors are represented by a population of binary strings. A binary string decodes into the value of i t that investor i uses at time t. During a time period t, t 2 f 1 : : : T max g, there are S realizations of the asset's return, and investors make S portfolio decisions using their values of i t 's that remain xed during t. After S realizations, the population is updated using reproduction, crossover, and mutation. The tness of each r u l e i s g i v en as a cumulative utility over S drawings. Mutation decreases exponentially over time.
Model of Mutual Funds Investors
Lettau's simulations show that genetic algorithm adaptive behavior leads to risk taking bias that depends on the number of market observations S that the agents use before they update their investment portfolio. For small values of S, GA converges to > indicating overinvestment i n to the risky asset. This bias vanishes as S gets large. Due to the distribution of asset returns, the selection pressure promotes lucky rules that overinvest in the risky asset for small S. A s S increases, agents are exposed to more trials and the chances of doing well due to luck decrease.
However, the patterns of behavior of mutual fund investors are much more volatile than what can be captured by a simple optimal portfolio choice model or an adaptive model that converges to a constant portfolio choice value. In fact, Lettau's analysis of the data on the ows in and out of mutual funds reveals that ows into mutual funds are positively correlated with returns, that ows are more sensitive to negative returns than to positive ones, and that evidence is stronger for riskier mutual funds.
In order to capture this more volatile behavior, Lettau modi es his GA model by i n troducing entry and exit of investors. At each t, a xed number of new investors whose investment strategies are randomly generated enters the population and replaces the same number of existing investors. The investors (or strategies) that exit the population are randomly determined. In addition, he sets S = 1 , a n d keeps the rate of mutation constant for the entire length of each s i m ulation. The continuous source of diversity from exit and entry, the minimal value of S, a n d a non-decreasing mutation rate resulted in persistent v olatility of the value of .
Lettau conducts 2 sets of GA simulations (i) using the normal distribution of returns with the mean and variance values equal to those calculated from the actual mutual fund data, and (ii) using the actual mutual fund returns. In both sets of simulations, GA agents exhibit the same pattern of behavior that looks very much like the behavior of mutual fund investors, i.e. ows into mutual funds are positively correlated with returns, and ows are more sensitive to negative returns than to positive ones. Like with the patterns of actual mutual fund ows, the GA portfolio adjustment is more extreme for high risk mutual fund returns.
Arti cial Stock M a r k et
The underlying economic environment of the arti cial stock market (Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer and Taylor, 1997 LeBaron, Arthur and Palmer, 1999) is again the simple asset pricing model where two assets are traded. The rst is a risk free bond which is in in nite supply and pays a constant i n terest rate, r. The second is a risky stock, in xed supply N, that pays a stochastic dividend, d t , which follows autoregressive process. The model has a richer structure than the Lettau's model. Prices are determined endogenously based on agents' demands for risky asset and the xed supply of the asset. The functional form of the agent's utility is again constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility g i v en by: U(W) = ;exp(; W). Under CARA utility and gaussian distributions of risky asset prices, agent i's demand, x i t , for holding shares of the risky asset is given by: x i t = E i t (p t+1 + d t+1 ) ; p t (1 + r) 2 i t p+d (19) where p t is the price of the risky asset at t, and 2 i t p+d is agent i's forecast of the conditional variance of p + d. (This relationship holds in the linear rational expectations equilibrium where distribution of prices is gaussian.) Given these individual demands, the equilibrium price p t can be computed from the market clearing condition where total demand must equal the number of shares issued, i.e.,
In the homogenous rational expectations equilibrium, the optimal forecasting function has the following form: In the arti cial stock market set up, agents' subjective expectational modes are represented by sets of rules that map states into forecasts. Each agent, i 2 f1 : : : N g, is endowed with a population of M condition/forecast rules that are a modi cation of Holland's`condition-action' classi er system. The set of states includes both`technical' information that compares current price to moving averages of di erent length (important for detecting a trend in prices), and`fundamental' that includes information on dividend price ratios.
A condition part of a rule is de ned over a trinary alphabet, of 0, 1 and # ( don't care), and consists of 12 bits corresponding to states. A forecast part of the rule is a real valued vector of length three corresponding to linear forecast parameters, and a conditional variance estimate. A forecast of a given rule j of agent i is then given as a linear combination of the price and dividend given by E i j (p t+1 + d t+1 ) = a i j (p t + d t ) + b i j (22) with^ 2 p+d = 2 i j . At time period t, a n i n vestor i makes a decision about the demand for risky asset x i t in the following way. First, the list of rules whose condition part matches the current state is determined and the most accurate rule is chosen. The investor uses the forecast estimates of this rule to formulate the demand for shares by substituting the values a i j , b i j , and 2 i j into equation (22). Once all the demands are submitted, the current p r i c e p t is calculated using (19) and (20). At the end of the trading period t, agents update the accuracy of all the matched forecasting rules according to an exponentially weighted average of squared forecast error, v 2 t i j = ( 1 ; 1 )v 2 t;1 i j + 1 ((p t + d t ) ; (a i j (p t;1 + d t;1 ) + b i j )) 2 : (23) The GA is applied on average every k periods, asynchronously across the agents. A fraction of worst performing rules is replaced by new rules generated through tournament selection, uniform crossover, and mutation. With uniform crossover, the new child's bit string is built one bit at a time, choosing a bit from each parent in the corresponding position with equal probability. F or the real number part of the rule, three di erent methods of crossover were used at random. First, all the real values are chosen from one parent selected at random. Second, a real value is chosen from each parent with equal probability. Third, the new values are created from a weighted average of the two parents values, using 1= 2 j as the weight f o r each rule. The weights are normalized to sum to 1.
Two t ypes of mutation are performed. For the condition part, the bits are ipped at random. For the forecast part, either new values are chosen randomly from the allowable ranges, using a uniform distribution, or the values are changed by a small, randomly chosen, amount.
Two sets of simulations were conducted. One in which the GA was implemented every 1,000 periods on average, and the other where it was implemented every 250 periods on average, called slow-, and fast-learning cases, respectively. T h e t wo s e t s of simulations gave qualitatively di erent patterns of behavior. In the slow-learning simulations, the market price quickly converged to the rational expectations price, while in the fast-learning simulations the complex behavior emerged.
LeBaron, Arthur and Palmer (1999) examine the time series properties of the asset prices generated in two sets of simulations in greater detail. The fast-learning simulations show evidence for the presence of ARCH e ects that is also a feature of actual asset prices time series. Both slow-and fast-learning cases show little indication of autocorrelation in the residuals of asset returns which is similar to actual markets. Finally, both cases show persistence in trading volume series and positive contemporaneous correlation between volume and volatility, again the feature of actual series.
Tests also showed additional predictability coming from technical trading bits as well as fundamental bits for the fast-learning case, while no such extra predictability was found in the slow-learning case. Both technical trading rules (see Brock e t al, 1992) as well as dividend price ratios (see Campbell and Shiller, 1988) have been shown to have some predictive v alue with actual time series of asset prices. Note that in the rational expectations equilibrium, neither one of these two t ypes of indicators, technical or fundamental, reveal any extra information since all the relevant information is contained in the lagged price.
Classi er Systems in Economic Environments
We h a ve seen two applications of the classi er systems to economic environments, to the search model of money and to the mean-variance asset pricing model. Classier systems are designed to evolve a set of rules that work we l l i n t h e e n vironments that require the use of di erent rules, avoiding the undue e ects of competition among them. It is worth pointing out that an equivalent GA can be constructed for a n umber of environments where di erent parts of a binary string are used under di erent circumstances. The Kiyotaki-Wright e n vironment i s o n e s u c h example. As we h a ve seen, Saudinger (1998) used a GA representation to evolve the set of rules for this environment. Classi er systems can be interpreted as models of individual learning, in some respects similar to the multiple-population GA. Again, elements of social learning can be added by h a ving agents exchange some of their rules.
Both applications of classi er systems that have been described in the survey use the GA for the updating of rules. However, some of the applications do not use the GA and the updating of classi ers takes place through the bucket brigade algorithm only (e.g. Lettau and Uhlig, 1999) . In this case, the system is based on the reinforcement of the rules that are initially speci ed as population members whose asymptotic behavior can be characterized analytically. Lettau and Uhlig (1999) implement this type of classi er system in a dynamic programming problem. Using stochastic approximation methods, they study the asymptotic outcome of classi er system learning and show that certain aspects of the classi er system are closely related to the value function in dynamic programming. In general, the learnable decision function is not unique and may not coincide with the optimal decision function even if that function is attainable. They use this result to explain the empirical puzzle of excess sensitivity of consumption to transitory income.
Search for optimal trading rules
Another strand of literature has used evolutionary algorithms, genetic programming (GP) in particular, to search for optimal trading rules (Allen and Karjalainen, 1999 Neely, W eller and Dittmar, 1997) in stock and foreign exchange markets. This research does not strictly fall into the category of models of section 4. However, we take a detour in order to describe GP and its applications to nance because technical trading emerged as an endogenous phenomenon in the arti cial stock m a r k et.
GP (Koza, 1992) is an extension of GAs where rules are represented as hierarchical compositions of functions of varying length. In these tree-like structures, the successors of each n o d e p r o vide the arguments for the function identi ed with the node. The terminal nodes (i.e. nodes with no successors) correspond to the input data. The set of functions appropriate to the particular problem is prespeci ed. Working with structures of varying length is intended to overcome the limitations of the xed-length genetic algorithm strings.
Like GAs, GP also maintains a population of genetic structures. The evolution takes place in a way v ery similar to the GA, using reproduction, crossover, and mutation on a population of tree structures. Crossover recombines two tree structures by replacing a randomly selected subtree in the rst parent with a subtree from the second parent. (The operation is subject to the restriction that the resulting tree must be a well-de ned rule.) Mutations are introduced by using a randomly generated tree in place of the second parent with a small probability. Initial population of trees is randomly generated.
In the above applications, trading rules are represented as trees. Functions that are usually speci ed are real-valued functions that include a function that computes a m o ving average of past prices (average) in a time window speci ed by a real-valued argument (rounded to an integer when the rule is evaluated), arithmetic operations (+, -, /, *), function returning the absolute value of the di erence between two real numbers (norm), Boolean functions that include logical functions (if-then-else, and, or, not) and comparisons of two real numbers (>, <), Boolean constants (true, false), and real constants. Allen and Karjalainen (1999) were the rst to use GP to nd pro table trading rules for S&P 500 index using daily prices from 1928 to 1995. They did not nd evidence that GP rules could earn consistent excess returns (after transaction costs) over a simple buy-and-hold strategy in the out-of-sample test periods.
However, search for good performing technical trading rules in foreign exchange markets resulted in di erent ndings. Neely, W eller and Dittmar (1997) use it in the foreign exchange markets (4 currencies, deutschemark, yen, pound sterling, and Swiss frank against $, and DM/Y, and pound sterling/ Swiss frank) and nd rules that generate economically signi cant excess returns after transactions costs when tested out-of-sample. It is interesting that the rules identi ed by GP similar to those commonly used by technical traders.
GP has greater exibility than GAs since they work with strings of variable length. However, trees that evolve through GP simulations often have v ery complicated nested structure with large number of levels and nodes, and sometimes a large number of redundant parts. Consequently, i t i s v ery di cult to interpret them. While GP seems quite suitable for applications like the ones described above where the task is to search for the rules from the available time series, they may be less useful for modeling learning in general equilibrium type of models where learning interacts with the environment. Inability to determine what the agents' rules actually mean and how they a ect other endogenous variables hinders the usefulness of GP in this type of environments. Brock and Hommes (1998a) nd that evolving the selection of prediction strategies can result in chaotic dynamics. They consider a version of the cobweb model in which a c o n tinuum of agents can choose between 2 di erent predictors, H 1 and H 2 , that correspond to two t ypes of expectations, naive (price this period will be just equal to the last period's price) and rational expectations. The fractions n 1 t and n 2 t of agents using H 1 and H 2 , respectively, c hanges over time.
Model with Costly Rational Expectations Predictor
Agents use a discrete choice model along the lines of Manski and McFadden (1981) to choose a predictor that they will use in the following period. The fractions of chosen predictors change over time according to the pro ts earned by agents. Agents can buy a rational expectations predictor, H 1 , at small but positive information cost C. This indicates an extra e ort that must be invested to obtain a more sophisticated price forecast. Alternatively, they can obtain a simple predictor, H 2 , for free. At time period t + 1, the market price p t+1 is given by: p t = A ; B(n 1 t q 1 t + n 2 q 2 t ) (24) where q 1 t and q 2 t are optimal quantities chosen by agents using predictors H 1 and H 2 respectively, and 1 t = b 2 p 2 t ; C 2 t = b 2 p t (2p t ; p t;1 )
are the pro ts realized at price p t . The updated fraction of agents that will use predictor H j , j 2 f 1 2g, a t t i m e t + 1 , i s g i v en by:
The parameter is the intensity of choice, measuring how fast agents switch predictors, i.e. how sensitive the mass of traders is to di erences in tness across trading strategies. The special limiting case with = + 1 corresponds to the neoclassical deterministic choice model, where in each period all agents choose the optimal predictor. If = 0, the mass of traders distributes itself evenly between the two predictors. Equations (24); (26) describe what Brock and Hommes call the adaptive rational equilibrium dynamics. 11 The case particularly interesting for the dynamics of the system is again the cobweb unstable case where the ratio of the slopes of demand and supply is greater than 1. If all agents use the simple predictor, the steady state with price p is unstable. If C = 0 and all agents employ rational expectations, the steady state is globally stable.
What happens when agents can use both predictors and C > 0? Consider rst an initial state where prices are close to the steady state value and almost all agents use naive expectations. The use of naive expectations results in a divergence away from the steady state. As prices diverge away from the steady state value, the prediction error from the naive expectations will increase. Consequently, a n umber of agents willing to use rational expectations increases. As this fraction increases, prices will be eventually pushed back t o wards their steady state value. At this point, the prediction error of naive expectations becomes small again. This implies that the net pro t corresponding to the sophisticated predictor becomes negative due to the information costs and the whole process is repeated. The speed at which the switching occurs depends on the intensity o f c hoice, . The value of determines dynamics of the system. For cobweb unstable case (B=b>1) and C > 0, the system is globally unstable for a large enough value of . B r o c k and Hommes prove that there is a range of values of for which 2-period cycle is stable. As increases further, numerical simulations show that the two-cycle loses stability and two stable four-cycles are created, and for even larger values, simulations indicate the occurrence of a chaotic attractor. Brock and Hommes prove that the system is chaotic for a positive Lebesgue measure set of (high) -values. 12 Brock and Hommes point out, that with the analytical results they provide, their work can be viewed as complimentary to the more numerically oriented evolutionary models of expectations (e.g. Arthur et al., 1997) . In fact, there is a parallel between the intensity o f c hoice that indicates how fast agents change predictors and the speed at which agents update their rules in arti cial stock markets. Higher intensity o f choice and more frequent updating of rules result in more complicated dynamics.
Model of Exchange Rate Behavior
This part of the survey reviews the role played by e v olutionary algorithms in modeling of the exchange rate dynamics. Persistent uctuations have c haracterized the behavior of the exchange rates ever since the exible exchange rate system was introduced. However, neither structural models nor time-series models have been successful in capturing a high percentage of the variation in the exchange rate at short-or-medium-term frequencies (Meese and Rogo , 1983 Frankel and Rose, 1995) . On the other hand, evolutionary dynamics, (Arifovic, 1996 Arifovic, 1999 result in persistent e x c hange rate uctuations that are driven by c hanges in agent's beliefs. Arifovic (1996) uses the GA in a two-country overlapping generations model identical to the one described in section 3, except that now there are two currencies that are perfect substitutes. Agents can hold any o f t h e t wo currencies without any restrictions. There are now t wo monetary authorities, one supplying H 1 (t) = H 1 of currency 1 and the other H 2 (t) = H 2 of currency 2. The exchange rate e(t) b e t ween the two currencies is de ned as e(t) = p 1 (t)=p 2 (t) w h e r e p 1 (t) is nominal price in terms of currency 1, and p 2 (t) is nominal price in terms of currency 2. When there is no uncertainty, the return on the two currencies must be equal, R 1 (t) = R 2 (t) = p 1 (t) p 1 (t + 1 ) = p 2 (t) p 2 (t + 1 ) t 1 (27) where R 1 (t) and R 1 (t) are the gross real rate of return between t and t + 1 . From equation (27) it follows that the exchange rate is constant o ver time:
e(t + 1 ) = e(t) = e t 1
Agent's savings, s(t), in the rst period of life, are equal to the sum of real holdings of currency 1 and currency 2. Aggregate savings that represent real world money demand are equal to the sum of young agents' savings, i.e. S(t) = Ns(t). Since the rates of return on the two currencies are identical, the agents are actually indi erent as to which currency they hold. Because of this, equations for individual money demands are not well de ned. This fact results in the indeterminacy of the exchange rate (Kareken and Wallace, 1981) that asserts that if there is a monetary equilibrium where savings demand and money supplies are equal for an exchange rate, e, then there exists an equilibrium for any e x c hange rateê 2 (0 1),ê 6 = e. Consider the equilibrium condition that aggregate savings (real world money demand) equal real world money supply: S(t) = H 1 + H 2 e p(t) (28) Then, if there is an equilibrium for a price sequence, fp 1 (t) p 2 (t)g, for the exchange rate e, w e can nd a sequence fp 1 (t) p 2 (t)g, for the exchange rateê that results in the same sequence of real rates of return as the original price sequence and, in turn, in the same values of aggregate savings. The reason why this can be accomplished is the equivalence between the two currencies as savings instruments. The GA economy has the structure identical to the one described before, i.e. at each t, there are 2 populations of binary strings, representing the rules of the young and the old agents. The di erence is that now a binary string i that characterizes agent i of generation t consists of two parts. The rst part represents the agents' The sequence of events corresponds to the one for the single-currency model. First, the nominal prices at time t and the rates of return between t ; 1 and t are computed. The exchange rate is determined. Next, the nominal holdings of currency 1 and 2 are computed for each m e m ber of generation t. These holdings of monies are carried over to period t + 1 .
Agents of generation t;1 use their holdings of monies to purchase the consumption good. Their second period consumption is computed and nally, utilities of the members of generation t ; 1 are computed which in turn determine the tness values of their decision rules. At the end of a cycle of two periods, agents update their rules using reproduction, crossover, mutation, and election.
The results of simulations showed persistent uctuations in the exchange rate, while average values of savings stayed close to the values of the stationary REE. The results are robust to the changes in the parameter values. Moreover, the stationary REE is unstable under the GA dynamics.
The out-of-equilibrium heterogeneity of the portfolio fraction values results in the inequality of the rates of return on two currencies, R 1 (t) and R 2 (t). The rates of return depend on the movements of s i (t)s and i (t)s that belong to di erent populations, but since there is not much m o vement i n s i (t)s, the movements in i (t)s are driving the dynamics. Let us assume that savings remain at the stationary value, s , and that H 1 = H 2 . Then, the rates of return on two currencies are given by R 1 (t) = (t)= (t ; 1), and R 2 (t) = ( 1 ; (t))=(1 ; (t ; 1)). The GA agents seek to exploit this arbitrage opportunity b y placing larger fractions of their savings into the currency that had a higher rate of return in the previous period.
In general, increasing sequences of (t) are required to preserve R 1 (t) > R 2 (t), and decreasing sequences to preserve R 1 (t) < R 2 (t). Suppose that R 1 (t ; 1) > R 2 (t ;1). At t, agents will attempt to put larger fractions into currency 1. Because of the election, (t) (t ;2) (these are the s that belong to the same population of rules). However, it is the relationship between (t) and (t ; 1), which belong to di erent populations, that determines R 1 (t) and R 2 (t).
If (t) > (t ; 1), the direction of the inequality is preserved, i.e. R 1 (t) > R 2 (t), the value of currency 1 increases. On the other hand, if the aggregate change is not large enough, (t) < (t ; 1), and R 1 (t) < R 2 (t). The reversal of inequality will prompt the agents to start placing more savings into currency 2, i.e. start decreasing individual i (t)'s. When this happens, (t) starts moving in the other direction. These dynamics bring about uctuations in the portfolio fraction and, consequently, in the exchange rate that persist over time. Overall, very high and very low v alues of (t) are less likely than the intermediate values. As (t) t a k es on relatively high (low) values, the probability of obtaining higher (lower) values decreases. In order to obtain an increasing sequence of (t) v alues, more and more bits have t o b e switched from 0 to 1. As (t) increases, the number of these bits decreases. Thus as (t) gets larger, the probability of further increases will decrease. Similar argument applies for decreasing sequence of (t) v alues and increasing number of 0s.
This prediction is con rmed by the results of simulations which s h o w that the mass of distribution of the values of (t) is concentrated in the interval 0:4 0:6]. The same distribution of the values of (t) w as observed in the experiments with human subjects where the same economies were simulated. Most of the values (87%) were concentrated in the same interval. Two other features of the experimental data are worth pointing out. The values of the individual portfolio fractions and thus the values of the exchange rates did not settle down, but kept uctuating. At the same time, the values of the rst period consumption settled close to the stationary values. Thus the genetic algorithm simulations capture these features of the experimental data. Arifovic (1999) studies the same model but uses a real number representation of the decision rules. Thus a decision rule of agent i of generation t is de ned by two real numbers, s i (t) 2 0 w 1 ] and i (t) 2 0 1]. The updating takes place using imitation, experimentation, and election. The imitation operator in this setup is equivalent to the reproduction with proportionate selection. Experimentation is equivalent t o m utation and is performed in the following way. A random number is drawn from the uniform distribution, for s i (t) from the interval 0 w 1 ], and for i (t) from the interval 0 1]. With this rule representation and updating scheme, the evolutionary algorithm represents a version of the stochastic replicator dynamics. 13 The instability of a stationary equilibrium is preserved under this updating scheme and the main features of the dynamics remain the same. In particular, the mass of distribution of (t) is concentrated in the (same) interval 0:4 0:6]. This represents one of the rst studies that examine the dynamics under binary and real number representation and demonstrate that the qualitative features of the dynamics are preserved under di erent rule representation schemes.
Overall, evolutionary models of the exchange rate generate persistent uctuations of the exchange rates that result from agents' portfolio adjustments. It is worth pointing out that statistical learning algorithms might not generate the persistent exchange rate volatility in the same OG environment. For example, the stochastic approximation algorithm converges to a stationary REE with the constant v alue of the exchange rate (see Sargent, 1993) .
Rational Agent versus BoundedlyRational Agents
In the same exchange rate model with real number representation of decision rules, Arifovic (1999) introduces a rational agent who has enough knowledge of the model to be able to make t wo-period ahead forecasts of the rates of return on two currencies. One rational agent is born at each t and lives for two periods. Based on these forecasts, the agent makes her optimal portfolio decision. Rational agent's decisions do not a ect the price levels.
The performance of the rational agent, in terms of the average utilities earned over long period of time, are compared to the performance of boundedly rational agents. The results show that the rational agent performs only slightly better than the average and the median boundedly rational agent. The di erences are greater for larger rates of mutation indicating that boundedly rational agents do worse if they experiment more. However, the best within a generation boundedly rational agent always does better than the rational agent and the di erence increases with the rate of experimentation.
Model with De cits Finally, i t i s w orth pointing out that study of the same type of the overlapping generations environment where two countries nance de cits of di erent sizes through seignorage does not generate persistent e x c hange rate volatility (Arifovic, in press ). Note that this economy i s a l s o c haracterized by the indeterminacy of the equilibrium exchange rate.
The results show that the currency used to nance the larger of the two de cits cannot survive in a free competition between the two currencies. Evolution of agents' decision rules results in a ight a way from this currency until it eventually becomes valueless. At the end of the adjustment process, agents hold all of their savings in the currency used to nance the lower of the two de cits. Thus, the economy converges to the equilibrium in which only the low-de cit currency is valued. This equilibrium is equivalent to a stationary equilibrium of the single currency model. The speed of adjustment depends on the size of the di erence between the two de cits. The larger the di erence, the smaller the number of periods that it takes to complete the process during which a g e n ts bring down the holdings of the high-de cit currency to zero.
Recurrent Currency Crisis
In the dynamics of currency crisis in the emerging markets, there is usually no apparent reason for a sudden shift in investors' expectations. 14 Models of speculative attacks where a currency crisis can take place due to the existence of sunspot equilibria (e.g. Cole and Kehoe, 1996 Jeanne and Masson, 1999) do not show h o w investors coordinate on a currency crisis path. Arifovic and Masson (1999) describe an evolutionary model that results in recurrent episodes of currency crisis that are driven solely by c hanges in investors' beliefs. The economy consists of a population of n risk neutral investors who make portfolio decisions i.e. how m uch of their wealth W to invest in an emerging market at the rate r t at time period t. The rest of their wealth investors invest in the U.S. market at the constant rate of return, r .
At each t, i n vestor i, i 2 f 1 : : : n g, i s c haracterized by a probability of devaluation i t , i t 2 0 max ]. that represents the expectation of how l i k ely devaluation in the following period is. Let t be the average of these expectations. The expected amount of devaluation, e , is equal across investors and constant o ver time.
Since this is a model with heterogeneous beliefs and no explicit assumption of optimizing behavior, the no-arbitrage condition cannot determine the value of r t . Instead, it is assumed that emerging market banks set the interest rate on bank deposits. They use the average of investors' expectations as a measure of the expected value of devaluation. Thus, the interest rate on emerging market deposits r t is set equal to the U.S. rate plus a weighted average of the expected rate of devaluation:
(1 + i t e ) 1 n ; 1 (29) where is a constant risk premium on the return on emerging market deposits. The investor i's rule for making a portfolio decision is given by: i t = 0 or 1 as (1+r ) > or < (1+r t )= (1 + )(1 + i t e )]. Let t be the average portfolio decision. At time t, the amount of emerging market deposits held by all foreign investors is D t = P n i=1 i t W. Note that in a representative a g e n t model of rational, risk neutral investors, the portfolio fraction value is indeterminate.
The underlying model is a balance-of-payments model with the following equations describing the change in reserves R t = R t;1 +T t +D t ;(1+r t;1 )D t;1 and the trade balance T t = + T t;1 + " t . where " is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 : Provided that R t is above 0, there is no devaluation at t i.e. t = 0 . H o wever, if reserves would otherwise be negative, there is a devaluation which reduces the amount repaid on borrowing undertaken at t ; 1 so that reserves at t equal zero.
Individual rates of return that investors earn determine tness at time t. T h us, a tness value of expectation i, i t , is equal to: i t = r t ; t if investor i invested her wealth in the emerging market, and to i t = r if she invested in the US market. A population of rules is updated every period using the two previously described operators, imitation and experimentation. Experimentation is performed with probability p ex by d r a wing a random number from the uniform distribution, in the interval 0 max ].
Simulations exhibit recurrent devaluations: extended periods of t = 0 are followed by instances of devaluation, t > 0, which take place over several periods. During the periods when t = 0 , t , and consequently, r t are decreasing while t and R t are increasing. On the other hand, during the periods of t > 0, t , and r t are increasing, R t is equal to zero and t is decreasing. Devaluations are triggered by r e v ersal in general pattern of falling values of t .
Note that, in any given period, as long as i t < t , i n vestor i will inve s t i n t h e emerging market and as long as t = 0 will earn the return r t > r . Thus, any individual investor has to be more optimistic than the average investor in order to invest in the emerging market. In the absence of devaluation, the evolutionary dynamics drive the value of t down, and increase the proportion of investors in the emerging market. However, eventually, t becomes small enough and enters into the region where a reversal of its decline occurs. This reversal occurs because there is a limit to the number of investors, so that increasing optimism cannot continue inde nitely. Once t starts increasing, investors become more and more pessimistic about emerging markets. In order to invest in an asset with the rate of return r , they have to be more pessimistic than the average investor. Eventually, a s t becomes high enough, another reversal occurs and it starts decreasing again. Thus, the observed dynamics look very much l i k e the dynamics of currency crisis observed in actual markets where there is no apparent reason for a sudden shift in investors' expectations and a withdrawal of deposits from the emerging market.
In addition to simulations, Arifovic and Masson consider two simpli ed versions of the model. The rst model is identical to the one used in simulations except that the number of investors is in nite. The analysis shows that, if t becomes too low, and gets into the range of values 0 max =2], this results in a reversal with t+1 ; t > 0. This triggers a crisis with several periods of devaluation that result in the increasing values of t . H o wever, as t enters into the region where its values are higher than max =(1 + p ex ), this triggers another reversal in its behavior and the crisis is halted.
The second is a model with in nite number of investors and only two t ypes of expectations, l and h , corresponding to a low and high expected probability o f devaluation. Those with h invest in the safe asset, and those with l invest in the emerging market. Arifovic and Masson characterize the behavior of the change in t+1 over time and show that, as it is increasing, it reaches a critical, maximum value of after which there is no further increase in its value, and (in the absence of large trade surpluses), reserves decline over time and lead to devaluation. After devaluation, the value t+1 drops to the value of p ex and then starts increasing again. Thus, this model results in a cyclical behavior of t+1 that is independent of the initial conditions.
Concluding Remarks
Two questions frequently arise regarding the implementation of evolutionary algorithms, genetic algorithms in particular, in economic modeling. The rst is the issue of interpretation of learning at the level of population and the second is the question of interpretation and motivation for the use of the crossover operator. For example, Fudenberg and Levine (1998) note that applications of GAs have tended to assume that an entire population of players jointly implements a GA, rather than each individual player implementing a GA, and that this implementation poses problems of how to motivate and interpret this type of learning, particularly with respect to the information required for application of crossover. They suggest that, instead, individual agents could implement GAs.
These models have been primarily used as models of social learning where an entire population(s) evolve through imitation, exchange of ideas, and experimentation. However, as some applications show, these algorithms can also be used as models of individual learning where evolution takes place on a set of competing beliefs of an indivdiual agents. (The examples are the use of multiple-population GA in the cobweb model and the use of classi er systems in the search model of money and in the arti cial stock market.) Which e v olutionary paradigm is more appropriate depends on a context and on a particular model. At the macroeconomic level, it seems plausible that, over time, learning takes place at the level of the economy i . e . that agents observe e a c h other's decisions and imitate those agents that have b e e n successful in the past. Notions of imitation of successful rms or investors have b e e n around in economic literature for a long time. Social learning represents explicit modeling of these notions. 15 On the other hand, if the objective of research is the examination of strategic interactions in game-theoretic framework, then individual learning might be a more appropriate paradigm.
The question of motivation and interpretation of crossover can be answered in two w ays. One is that it is used to capture the idea of exchange of information between agents, and the second is that the evolutionary process can be represented with imitation (reproduction) and experimentation (mutation) only. The question remains what the impact of crossover is. Are there are going to be qualitative di erences in the results of simulations with and without crossover?
Evolutionary algorithms have p r o ven successful in addressing a number of issues in macroeconomic environments. They are useful devices in the selection of equilibria. When evidence from the experiments with human subjects is used for evaluation, they perform well in capturing the main features of the experimental data (e.g. cobweb model, single currency and 2-currency overlapping generations economy, s e a r c h model of money).
Related to the issue of equilibrium selection is the learnability of equilibria. In other words, how hard is it to learn certain equilibria? Interesting results that come out of the study of evolutionary algorithms show that that there are equilibria that are easier to learn and others that cannot be learned. One of the examples is the search model of money, where agents always coordinate on the fundamental equilibrium, or what seems to be close to the fundamental equilibrium allocations, and are not able to learn how to coordinate on the speculative equilibria. The other is the overlapping generations model with periodic and chaotic equilibrium trajectories where genetic algorithm coordinates on equilibria of low order, and never selects high order equilibria which again appear to be hard to learn. Both of these results are supported by evidence from the experiments with human subjects.
In addition to equilibrium selection, the use of evolutionary modeling has also been useful in providing a description of the transitional dynamics in a model of growth with human capital accumulation. In addition, this type of model can account for di erent timing of development takeo s in case of the economies with identical initial conditions, and for persistence in di erences in per capita income across the economies. The results on transitional dyanamics in a growth model suggest another important area of research that has not been explored so far. It is the behavior of these models in the environments where there are sudden policy changes. Transitional, evolutionary dynamics could be quite di erent from the RE predictions, particularly in the economies with multiple equilibria.
Competition of di erent forecasting rules is another issue that has been examined. This competition in a coevolutionary environment brings more stability to the economy (cobweb model) and can evolve populations of heterogenous forecasts that result in identical, equilibrium decision rules, which suggests that agents need not have identical forecasts to coordinate on an equilibrium path (n-period overlapping generations economy).
These models have also had success in capturing features of the actual time series of asset prices that a number of asset-pricing models and models of exchange rate have failed to account for (e.g. model of mutual fund investors, arti cial stock market model, model of the exchange rate, model of currency crisis). The analysis showed that time series generated by the arti cial stock m a r k et overall match the actual time series much better than RE versions of the asset pricing models. In general, RE models cannot capture the features of the actual asset prices time series and cannot explain the observed volume of trading, its persistence and co-movement with volatility of asset prices.
The observed volatility of the exchange rate in a 2-currency model matches the features observed in the experiments with human subjects. The persistence of volatility is the feature of the actual time series of exchange rates that other models of the exchange rate behavior have failed to account for. An evolutionary model of currency crisis generates dynamics that look very much l i k e the dynamics of the actual currency crisis.
Another interesting nding from the long-run learning dynamics di erent f r o m rational expectations equilibrium outcomes is that the frequency of learning can qualitatively change the dynamics of the system. More frequent updating leads to persistent v olatility o f o ws in and out of mutual funds, and to complex stock market dynamics. Similarly, higher intensity o f c hoice in the cobweb model results in chaotic trajectories.
One of the challenges that the research in this area faces is the extension of evolutionary models to the general equilibrium type of economies with multiple markets. The main issue is the one of determination of prices. These models cannot take advantage of computing prices through simultaneous determination of agents' optimal decisions and market clearing conditions. Instead, the calculation of prices has to be explicitly modeled by describing a bargaining process or some other equilibrating mechanism. This adds an extra layer of complexity on top of the dynamics that tend to be quite complicated anyway. However, this obstacle will have t o b e o vercome if these models are to be more widely used in general equilibrium setting.
As already noted, agents' beliefs and actions a ect the price levels which i n t u r n a ect agents' payo s in models with evolutionary learning. These self-referential systems with heterogenous beliefs that evolve o ver time result in complicated dynamics that cannot be characterized analytically. However, techniques similar to those used in evolutionary game theory could be used in some of the models to examine the local stability of equilibria under the evolutionary dynamics. In addition, the analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the simpli ed versions of models can improve our understanding of simulations and provide support for the observed behavior (e.g. a cobweb model with two t ypes of predictors, model of currency crisis). Finally, the competition of di erent rules, where their survival depends on performance, is an important feature that distinguishes evolutionary learning from statistical learning. This feature can be used to gain further insights into the evolutionary dynamics by examining the ways in which algorithms interact with economic environments in which they are implemented.
Endnotes
1. There is a large number of applications of these algorithms in other areas of economics and in game theory. F or an overview, see Dawid (1999) .
2. For an introduction to GAs see Goldberg (1989) or Michalewicz (1996) . 3. Chen and Yeh (1994) apply genetic programming to the cobweb model. They nd that the evolutionary process modeled using the genetic programming gets in the neighborhood of the REE for both the stable and unstable case.
4. For further details on how the condition is derived see Dawid, 1999. 5 . Note that the least squares estimate of the in ation rate was obtained by regression of prices on past prices. Evans and Honkapohja (1999) note that the failure of least squares learning to converge might be the result of this particular learning scheme. Since the price level in either steady state is a trended series, whereas the in ation rate is not, it would be more natural to estimate the in ation rate by its sample mean.
6. The E-stability analysis (Evans and Honkapohja, 1995a) selects the 2-cycle over the steady state in this model. This result is interesting in light of the result obtained with the application of the genetic algorithm: the E-stability selection criterion correctly predicts the outcome of genetic algorithm adaptation in this model.
7. The stability of steady state and periodic equilibria under learning dynamics has been the subject of a number of studies e.g. Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) and Honkapohja (1995a, 1995b) .
8. See Van Huyck, Cook, and Battalio (1994) . 9. Goldberg (1989) and Sargent (1993) provide good description of classi er systems.
10. The selection can also be made randomly with probabilities proportional to classi ers' strengths.
11. More generally, a performance measure which i s a w eighted average of past realized net pro ts can be used instead of the last period pro ts. The choice of the length of the horizon and the weights is going to a ect the dynamics of the system. 12. Brock and Hommes (1998b) use the same framework to study the behavior of investors using di erent predictors in a simple mean-variance model and show the possibility for the emergence of chaotic trajectories.
13. Notice that there is no operator that corresponds to crossover. It has been omitted to allow a greater degree of analytical tractability.
14. For example, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1996 , failed to identify signi cantly worse macroeconomic fundamentals in periods of crisis versus non-crisis periods.
15. Note that the framework of evolutionary game theory is also based on the speci cation of learning dynamics at the level of population.
